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REPLY
DOUBLE LIABILITY OF BANK SHAREHOLDERS: A




In a recent article, we presented a historical analysis of the regime of
double liability for bank shareholders that existed in the United States
between the Civil War and the Great Depression.1 Under this regime of
double liability, if a bank failed, a receiver would be appointed to deter-
mine the extent to which the bank's liabilities exceeded its assets.2 Share-
holders would then be required to pay an amount up to and including the
par value of their stock to satisfy the outstanding claims.3 Under current
law, the regime of limited liability that existed for about seventy-five
years has now been replaced by a more traditional corporate law para-
digm in which shareholders' risks are capped at the amount of their ini-
tial capital investment. Moreover, the protections for depositors once
provided by the regime of double liability have now been replaced by a
federally sponsored program of deposit insurance.
In our article, we identified one principal advantage of the regime of
double liability over the current situation. We noted that, while deposit
insurance has proven effective at preventing bank runs and instilling pub-
lic confidence in the banking system, it also provides incentives for exces-
sive risk taking by banks, which in turn leads to a greater risk of bank
failures generally.4 The incentives for shareholders to engage in activities
* The authors are, respectively, J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School, and Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago School of Law.
1. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:
History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1992) [hereinafter Macey & Miller,
Double Liability].
2. Id. at 31.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 33. For further discussion regarding the causes of bank failures, see Jonathan
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that fixed claimants (such as bondholders or uninsured depositors) regard
as excessive risk taking is not unique to banking. As residual claimants,
shareholders capture the excess returns from excessive risk taking in all
contexts.1\ Riskier ventures enrich shareholders at the expense of creditors
because shareholders do not have to share any of the gains with creditors,
despite the fact that creditors bear part of the risks associated with the
riskier ventures.6
Normally, creditors, anticipating the prospect of excessive risk taking
by shareholders and shareholder-controlled management, will try to con-
trol such risk taking by obtaining contractual protections, as well as by
adjusting the price they are willing to pay for corporate debt obligations.
However, government-provided, fixed-premium deposit insurance makes
banks fundamentally different from other sorts of corporate enterprises
because insured depositors are indifferent to the issue of risk. Depositors
and other fixed claimants who enjoy insurance protections have no incen-
tive even to attempt to influence or control the excessive risk-taking
proclivities of the banks in which they place their funds because their
funds will be protected regardless of the outcomes of the investment
strategies that banks elect.7
The basic point of our previous Wake Forest Law Review article was
that the double liability regime was an effective regulatory system be-
cause it mitigated the excessive risk-taking proclivities of banks.s It ac-
complished this result by aligning the interests of shareholders with those
of fixed claimants such as depositors.9 If a system of double liability could
be made effective, shareholders and shareholder-controlled management
teams would have fewer incentives to engage in excessive risk taking be-
cause they would be exposed to at least part of the costs associated with
those activities. Shareholders subject to double liability are particularly
appropriate monitors of bank management because-unlike subordinated
debtholders or other creditor monitors-they have every incentive to en-
courage bank managers to increase profits while at the same time discour-
aging excessive risk taking because of the fear of assessment in the event
of bank failure.
As we observed in our previous article, empirical evidence substanti-
ates the conclusion that double liability was a substantial motivating fac-
tor for shareholders. We found that about 50.8 % of amounts assessed
against shareholders ultimately was collected.10 This ~mpirical finding is
particularly important from a policy perspective because critics of share-
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank
Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153 (1988) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Bank Failures].
5. Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 4, at 1202.
6. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74
AM. ECON. REV. 650, 653 (1984) (discussing the risk-preferring nature of shareholders as op-
posed to the risk-adverse nature of managers and creditors).
7. Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 4, at 1165.
8. Macey & Miller, Double Liability, supra note 1, at 61-62.
9. ld.
10. ld. at 56, tbl. 1.
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holder liability have charged that it would not be possible for courts to
devise workable rules to permit the administration of a regime of double
liability. In fact, our historical and empirical analysis revealed that in all
of the major problem areas-determining the assessment amount, identi-
fying the persons liable for assessment, defining the scope of administra-
tive discretion, enforcing assessments in group litigation settings, and
accommodating the assessment remedy to situations where mergers and
other fundamental corporate changes have occurred-courts were able to
resolve satisfactorily the administrative problems involved in making
double liability a meaningful regulatory system. l1
Another significant finding of our study was that, unlike deposit in-
surance, the legal regime of double liability induced caution on the part
of bank managers in the use of depositors' funds.12 The support for this
conclusion lies in the fact that many more banks liquidated voluntarily
during the period of double liability than went into involuntary insol-
vency.13 These voluntary liquidations meant that bank assets were con-
veyed into the hands of new investors without the need for costly
insolvency proceedings. As we observed, "[i]f financially troubled banks
can be closed early-before liabilities exceed assets-creditors, including
depositors, will be paid in full."I"
Double liability gave bank shareholders an incentive to liquidate
their banks voluntarily before losses became too great in order to avoid
insolvency. By contrast, under the current system of government-spon-
sored deposit insurance, shareholders have an incentive to keep their
banks open as long as possible, taking ever-increasing risks in the hope
that one last "roll of the dice" at some venture or other will return their
banks to profitability. Mter all, such shareholders reason, the costs of
these risks will be shouldered by the government, since the shareholders'
equity claims already have been dissipated, while the benefits will flow to
the shareholders.
Finally, in our previous piece, we studied failures of national banks
during the 1856-1934 period to determine losses to depositors during that
time frameY; We found that during most of this period, losses to deposi-
tors were surprisingly small.16 Many banks failed, but depositors received
substantial payments in liquidation.17
As part of this broader project, we studied bank failures during the
1930-34 period to determine the losses to depositors of national banks.IS
In particular, we examined 688 receiverships that were terminated by Oc-
tober 31, 1937. We found that losses to depositors were very smal}.19 Spe-
11. [d. at 61.
12. [d. at 58.
13. [d. at 57-58.
14. [d. at 34.
15. [d. at 55-61.
16. [d. at 58.
17. [d. at 57-58.
18. [d. at 55-61.
19. [d. at 58-59.
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cifically, we found that during the 1930-34 period, the average annual loss
to depositors of failed national banks was only 7.7 'basis points, or 7.7
cents per hundred dollars of deposits.20
1. PROFESSOR JACKSON'S DATA
In a new and more complete study of national bank receiverships
during the 1930-34 period, Professor Howell Jackson examines data for
1,595 national banks.21 Professor Jackson includes additional observations
in his data set and extended the period of his inquiry concerning receiver-
ships. While we stopped with receiverships that were completed by Octo-
ber 31, 1937, Professor Jackson uses receiverships that were completed as
late as October 31, 1941.22 Thus, while Jackson's analysis covers the same
1930-34 period that we covered, his study includes receiverships that took
far longer to complete than the receiverships we examined in our study.
In his study; Professor Jackson finds that depositor losses during the
1930-34 period were significantly higher than we reported.23 By including
receiverships that terminated between October 31, 1937, and October 31,
1941, Professor Jackson finds that depositors in the national banking sys-
tem lost slightly more than twenty cents for every hundred dollars of de-
posits, instead of the 7.7 cents we reported.24 By including receiverships
that terminated even after 1941, Professor Jackson's estimates of deposi-
tor losses rise still further, to 47.9 cents per hundred dollars of
depositors.2G
II. IMPLICATIONS
Upon the publication of our previous article, we were pleased that
our early analysis had a significant impact on those participating in the
ongoing debates concerning banking policy and corporate gQvernance is-
sues.26 For example, prior to the publication of our article, Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman had argued that shareholders should
face unlimited liability for corporate torts.27 Our analysis has helped to
20. Id. at 59, tbl. 2.
21. Howell E. Jackson, Losses From National Bank Failures During the Great De-
pression: A Response to Professors Macey and Miller, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 919, 926
(1993).
22. Id. at 26-27.
23. Id. at 927.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 929.
26. For several articles citing Macey & Miller, Double Liability, supra note 1, in their
discussions of banking policy and corporate governance, see Larry E. Ribstein, Efficiency,
Regulation and Competition: A Comment on Easterbrook & Fischel's Economic Structure
of Corporate Law, 87 Nw. L. REV. 2541 (1992); Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation 01 Lim-
ited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992); Peter P. Swire,
Bank Insolvency Law Now that it Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469 (1992).
27. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
HeinOnline -- 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 937 1993
1993] SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY 937
inform the debate as to whether this system could be administered.28 In
light of Professor Jackson's new data, it seems appropriate to reexamine
the policy implications we drew from our previous analysis.
Professor Jackson concludes that "the pre-New Deal era of banking
regulation was not a regulatory paradise from which we foolishly strayed
in the first hundred days of Franklin Roosevelt's Presidency."29 Of
course, we never suggested that the double liability system was a regula-
tory paradise. Indeed, in our article we stressed that we did not even con-
sider whether double liability offered any hope of addressing
contemporary problems in the banking industry.3o
More troubling is Professor Jackson's conclusion that our data set,
albeit truncated in comparison to his own, has a' "critical flaw"31 and "se-
riously misstates the historical record."32 First, Professor Jackson does
not challenge our data on the recovery rates on shareholder assessments.33
Nor does he seem to doubt that the prospect of double liability induced
ex ante monitoring.34 Further, he does not dispute our findings for the
more than half-century period between 1865 and 1930.35 Thus, while Pro-
fessor Jackson may be correct that the rule did not prevent significant
losses to shareholders in the unusual conditions between 1930 and 1934,36
the conclusion that depositors would have been worse off without double
liability seems impossible to refute. Of course, the test of any economic or
social policy is not whether it produces "paradise," but whether it is bet-
ter than the real-world alternatives.
As noted above, Professor Jackson comments on the conclusions we
reached based on our data. This is largely due to the fact that Professor
Jackson has not carefully analyzed the implications of his own data. He
has little quarrel with the conclusions we reached on the basis of our
data. His point is that our data set, while extensive, should have been
expanded.37 In particular, in Professor Jackson's view, we should not have
stopped with liquidations that were terminated in 1937.38 He argues that
by including institutions that were terminated as late as 1941 and be-
yond, we would have reached dramatically different conclusions about the
effects of double liability on depositors' wealth.39
28. For articles citing Macey & Miller, Double Liability, supra note 1, in a discussion
of the administration of unlimited liability for corporate torts, see Joseph A. Grundfest, The
Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387
(1992); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited
Liability? A Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427 (1992).
29. Jackson, supra note 21, at 930.
30. Macey & Miller, Double Liability, supra note 1, at 62.
31. Jackson, supra note 21, at 925.
32. [d. at 921.
33. [d. at 930.
34. [d.
35. [d. at 931.
36. [d. at 930.
37. [d. at 926.
38. [d.
39. [d. at 927.
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While Professor Jackson's new data is interesting and important, the
conclusions he draws require further analysis. The first and most interest-
ing question concerns the overall data set. It is entirely inappropriate, in
considering the implications of double liability, to examine only the pe-
riod between 1930 and 1934 when all economic institutions faced ex-
traordinary conditions. To assess the double liability system accurately, it
is necessary to evaluate its performance over the full period of its exis-
tence. As our earlier article demonstrated, and as Professor Jackson does
not dispute, the overall performance of double liability appears to have
been remarkably good.40
Second, it is important to consider why depositor losses were· so
much greater in those bank insolvencies that were not terminated early.
In other words, the greater depositor losses found by Professor Jackson
result from receiverships that dragged on beyond 1937.41 Professor Jack-
son reasons that "one also might reasonably suspect that [Macey and
Miller] inadvertently omitted the institutions that had the worst assets
and required the longest time to liquidate."42
This is certainly a possibility. However, Professor Jackson provides
no reason why it is necessarily the case that firms with the worst assets
required the longest time to liquidate. It would be just as easy (and as
plausible) to assert that firms with the worst assets required the least
time to liquidate. Mter all, at the limit, where an asset has absolutely no
value, liquidation simply would require that the asset be written off, a
process which takes almost no time at all. Alternatively, it could be that
the creditor structure of certain banks caused delays, or that certain re-
ceivers were less competent than others, or that large banks took more
time to liquidate, or that the mix of assets held by certain banks caused
delays in liquidation. Thus, an equally plausible explanation is that there
was no difference in asset quality among the banks.
The higher losses for the slower terminations may have resulted from
the simple fact that institutions that were wound up faster experienced
lower losses because of the predictable decline in assets that accompanies
protracted insolvency proceedings. In addition, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that the administrative costs of a long liquidation proceeding are
higher than the liquidation costs of a short proceeding. This too could
account for the higher losses for depositors in cases where the receiver-
ships were not terminated in a timely fashion.
This explanation is consistent with the basic intuition that the earlier
losses are recognized and dealt with, the lower they will be. Just as early
closures can reduce creditor losses, so too can early resolution of bank
failures. As Professor Lynn LoPucki recently has shown, the added costs
associated with the 1986 revisions to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
are attributable to the additional time involved in completing bankruptcy
40. See Macey & Miller, Double Liability, supra note 1, at 61-62 (discussing positive
impact of double liability scheme on depositors).
41. Jackson, supra note 21, at 927.
42. Id. at 926.
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proceedings.43 Professor LoPucki found that resources are consumed dur-
ing long insolvencies as creditors and debtors struggle to protect their in-
vestments.44 Moreover, companies perform poorly during protracted
insolvencies because of cash flow problems, difficulties with suppliers and
customers, and the excessive time management must spend in legal and
administrative matters which diverts them from operational matters.45
Consistent with that analysis, it appears that delay in liquidations also
adds costs.
Thus, what Professor Jackson has demonstrated with his expanded
data set is that extending the length of time involved in the insolvency
process increased depositor losses. His data cannot be interpreted to show
that double liability was ineffective in stemming depositor losses. As
noted above, the higher losses found in Professor Jackson's expanded
sample have more to do with the shortcomings of protracted liquidation
proceedings than with the shortcomings of double liability.
More important, even if the losses to depositors were higher than
previously thought during the 1930-34 period, double liability remains
valuable as long as it reduced losses to depositors below what such losses
would have been in the absence of double liability. In other words, the
critical question is whether· the bank failure problem would have been
worse during the Great Depression without double liability. Professor
Jackson's data and analysis, for all of their interest and importance, do
not provide even a scintilla of evidence on this point. Indeed, his own
work suggests that he is in full agreement with us that the problems of
moral hazard and adverse selection can be reduced by imposing expanded
liability on the banking system.46
Professor Jackson makes much of the fact that the depositor loss
figures he reports are higher than the annual premiums paid by banks for
deposit insurance today.47 However, as already noted, to look only at the
1930-34 period provides an exceptionally skewed picture of depositor
losses during the double liability system. Further, Professor Jackson's cal-
culation of deposit insurance premium costs focuses exclusively on banks'
out-of-pocket costs for deposit insurance, and ignores the most significant
costs, such as higher capital costs, reserve requirements, lending restric-
tions, restrictions on portfolio content, and other regulatory and activities
restrictions thought necessary to implement the deposit insurance system.
Thus, it is inappropriate to compare depositors' losses during the early
1930's with modern FDIC insurance premiums as Professor Jackson does,
because his calculations ignore all of the extra costs associated with the
current system, and thereby makes the modern system of federally spon-
43. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729.
44. [d. at 732-37.
45. [d. at 738.
46. Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Bank Holding Companies, 107
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994); Howell E. Jackson, The Superior Performance of Savings
and Loan Associations with Substantial Holding Companies, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 405 (1993).
47. Jackson, supra note 21, at 930.
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sored deposit insurance appear much less costly than it actually is.
CONCLUSION
Professor Jackson's expanded data set presents an improvement on
the data set compiled in our earlier article for the 1930-34 period. How-
ever, it would be inappropriate to conclude from his new and improved
data that double liability for depositors was a failure.
Professor Jackson's article does not dispute the fact that during the
vast preponderance of the life of the system, double liability was a suc-
cess.48 His new data addresses only the 1930-34 period when conditions
throughout the economy were extraordinarily disrupted. It would be per-
ilous to assess the value of double liability on the basis of its performance
during this period alone. .
Further, Professor Jackson draws unnecessarily sweeping conclusions
with respect to the 1930-34 period. With Professor Jackson's recent con-
tribution to the literature, we have what is, in effect, two discrete data
sets for this period. One should not be too quick to combine the two sets
in the way that Professor Jackson has done in his reply to our previous
article. The first data set consists of our numbers, which include receiver-
ships that were terminated by October 31, 1937.49 The second data set
consists of the receiverships that were terminated by October 31, 1941.GO
The losses in the second data set are much higher than the losses in the
first. This difference might be attributed to a failure of the double liabil-
ity system, as Professor Jackson suggests; however, it could just as plausi-
bly be attributed to a failure of protracted receiverships. Professor
Jackson may only have shown that the salutary effects of double liability
can be reduced if the banks are wound up by incompetent receivers who
take too long to do their job, thereby causing the assets under their con-
trol to deteriorate.
In any event, Professor Jackson supports our basic conclusion that
recovery rates from stockholders were high.Gl This was our main point,
because as long as a system of double liability can be made to work ad-
ministratively, it will reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard
problems that create incentives for excessive risk taking among bank
shareholders and shareholder-controlled management teams. That analy-
sis is not in dispute.
With regard to comparing loss rates with depo&it insurance premi-
ums, historical comparisons of this kind are difficult, particularly because,
as noted above, the regulatory regime is much different today and the
nominal cost of deposit insurance premiums captures only a fraction of
the costs associated with that regulatory system. Double liability is desir-
able because it mitigates the adverse selection/moral hazard problems as-
48. [d. at 931.
49. Macey & Miller, Double Liability, supra note 1, at 56.
50. Jackson, supra note 21, at 927.
51. [d. at 930.
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sociated with deposit insurance. Thus, Jackson's data does not disturb
our point that double liability might be a natural complement to a pri-
vate deposit insurance regime, because double liability forces the benefi-
ciaries of bank risk taking to internalize the costs of risk taking.
From a policy standpoint, the question is whether there would have
been even more bank failures and even greater losses without double lia-
bility during the 1930-34 period. While Professor Jackson's analysis has
deepened our understanding of the historical record with respect to
double liability during this five-ye{ll" period, he has not disturbed our in-
ference that double liability did in fact reduce both the incidence and the
severity of the bank failures of the Great Depression. Nor has his work
undermined the general theoretical and empirical case for double liability
stock as an appropriate monitoring device for banking firms.
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